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I. INTRODUCTION
n the past twenty years a growing number of courts, both state' and
federal,2 have addressed the problem of the admissibility in a criminal
' See, e.g., Prewitt v. State, 460 So. 2d 296 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984); State v. Contreras,
718 P.2d 792 (Alaska 1986); State ex rel Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d
1266 (1982); State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274 (1981); Rock v. State, 288 Ark. 566,
708 S.W.2d 78, cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 430 (1986); People v. Guerra, 37 Cal. 3d 385, 690
P.2d 635, 208 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1984); People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal.
Rptr. 243, modified, 31 Cal. 3d 918(a), 181 Cal. Rptr. at 273, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860
(1982); People v. Zamarripa, 174 Cal. App. 3d 595, 220 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1985); People v. Rex,
689 P.2d 669 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984); People v. Quintanar, 659 P.2d 710 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982);
State v. Atwood, 39 Conn. Supp. 273, 479 A.2d 258 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984); State v. Davis,
490 A.2d 601 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985); Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9 (Fla 1985); Brown v. State,
426 So. 2d 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Moreno, _--Haw. -, 709 P.2d 103 (1985);
State v. Iwakiri, 106 Idaho 618, 682 P.2d 571 (1984); Peterson v. State, 448 N.E.2d 673 (Ind.
1983); State v. Haislip, 237 Kan. 461, 701 P.2d 909, cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 575 (1985); State
v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 464 A.2d 1028 (1983); Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d
302 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969); Commonwealth v. Kater, 388 Mass. 519, 447
N.E.2d 1190 (1983); People v. Gonzales, 415 Mich. 615, 329 N.W.2d 743 (1982), modified,
417 Mich. 968, 336 N.W.2d 751 (1983); State v. Ture, 353 N.W.2d 502 (Minn. 1984); State
v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980); House v. State, 445 So. 2d 815 (Miss. 1984); State
v. Levering, 213 Neb. 686, 331 N.W.2d 500 (1983); State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86
(1981); State v. Hutchinson, 99 N.M. 616, 661 P.2d 1315 (1983); State v. Beachum, 97 N.M.
682, 643 P.2d 246 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981), cert. quashed, 98 N.M. 51, 646 P.2d 1040 (1982);
People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523,453 N.E.2d 484, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1983); State v. Peoples,
311 N.C 515, 319 S E.2d 177 (1984); State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d 138 (N.D. 1983); State v.
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trial of testimony by a witness whose memory has been "refreshed" by the
use of pre-trial hypnosis.3 Due to the divergence of scientific opinion on:
(1) the nature and reliability of the hypnotic process to produce accurate
(or actual) recall; and (2) its possible effect on a witness' subsequent
testimony, expert testimony regarding hypnosis has not been dispositive
of the question. In fact, the only thing that the courts, like the experts,
can agree on is that they cannot agree.
Some courts are of the opinion that hypnosis is nothing more than a
memory aid, to be treated like any other device to refresh recollection. 4
Other courts believe hypnosis is more of a "science," and as such should
be treated consistently with the rules for the admission of other scien-
tific evidence, 5 as they have been applied, for instance, to lie detect-
Weston, 16 Ohio App. 3d 279, 475 N.E.2d 805 (1984); Standridge v. State, 701 P.2d 761
(Okla. Crim. App. 1985); Robison v. State, 677 P.2d 1080 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 3524 (1984); State v. Jorgensen, 8 Or. App. 1, 492 P.2d 312 (1971); Common-
wealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 436 A.2d 170 (1981); State v. Pierce, 263 S.C. 23, 207
S.E.2d 414 (1974); Burnett v. State, 642 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); State v. Martin,
101 Wash. 2d 713, 684 P.2d 651 (1984); State v. Laureano, 101 Wash. 2d 745, 682 P.2d 889
(1984). This list is not meant to be, nor is it, a complete representation of all the state cases
that have dealt with this issue over the past twenty years. It is meant only to convey the
significance of the issue, as indicated by the sheer number of cases addressing it. These
cases do, however, represent the most significant decisions on the issue, in that they are the
ones generally looked to by the courts addressing it for the first time.
2 See, e.g., United States v. Keplinger, 776 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 2919 (1986); United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Awkard, 597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979); United States v. Adams,
581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978); McQueen v. Garrison, 617 F.
Supp. 633 (E.D.N.C. 1985); United States v. Waksal, 539 F. Supp. 834 (S.D. Fla. 1982), rev'd
on other grounds, 709 F.2d 653 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252
(E.D. Mich. 1977).
3 Generally, the courts are presented with this issue in one of two ways. The majority
of cases involve situations wherein the prosecution attempts to introduce at trial the
incriminating testimony of a witness who had undergone a hypnotic session prior to trial,
usually during the investigation of the crime. Correspondingly, it is equally possible,
although not nearly as common, for a defendant to attempt to introduce the testimony of a
previously hypnotized witness, usually the defendant himself. See infra text accompanying
notes 90-93. Alternatively, a defendant might try to introduce exculpatory testimony
regarding statements made while either the defendant himself or some other witness was
under hypnosis. See infra note 13.
' See, e.g., State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d 138, 151 (N.D. 1983). The court in State v.
Brown noted, in regard to the jurisdictions that have adopted this reasoning, that "[t]hese
courts generally reason that the testimony of a witness whose memory has been enhanced
through hypnosis should be treated like other witnesses whose present recollection has been
refreshed." Id.
s See State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 708, 464 A.2d 1028, 1047 (1983) (Murphy, C.J.,
concurring and dissenting). See also infra note 86 (courts holding hypnosis subject to the
Frye test for the admissibility of scientific evidence).
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol34/iss4/8
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torsj voice print analysis, 7 and breath analysis devices designed to test for
intoxication.8 This divergence of legal, as well as scientific, opinion has
led to the adoption of five different legal tests utilized by the various
jurisdictions to resolve the issue of the admissibility of hypnotically
"refreshed" testimony ("HRT"). The author has categorized these tests as
follows: (i) credibility; (ii) reliability; (iii) safeguards; (iv) relevancy
balancing; and (v) totality of circumstances. 9 In addition to those juris-
dictions that have resolved the issue, still others, like Ohio, have not had
a sufficiently concrete opportunity to decide the question, and as to those
states, the legal standard to be applied to HRT remains, as yet, unre-
solved.
While the reliability of using hypnosis to refresh a witness' memory
and hence hisl ° testimony to be used in a criminal proceeding is not an
entirely unfamiliar issue to the Ohio criminal justice system, it has never
been directly addressed by the Ohio Supreme Court. Ohio has, however,
6 See, e.g., Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); State v. Wakefield, 263
N.W.2d 76 (Minn. 1978).
' See, e.g., State ex rel Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn, 442,192 N.W.2d 432 (1971); State
v. Cary, 49 N.J. 343, 230 A.2d 384 (1967).
s See, e.g., People v. Morse, 325 Mich. 270, 38 N.W.2d 322 (1949).
9 (i) The credibility test is a rule of perse admissibility. Under this approach, a pre-trial
hypnotic session does not affect the competency of the witness, but rather goes to the weight
to be given that testimony by the trier of fact. (ii) Generally speaking, the reliability test
uses, as its main criteria for admissibility, the rule of Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013
(D.C. Cir. 1923). The Frye rule has been interpreted as the test for determining the
admissibility of evidence obtained from new scientific principles or discoveries. Under this
approach, hypnosis, as a scientific procedure, is to be judged on its "general acceptance"
within the scientific community. However, because practically speaking, no two experts can
agree on the reliability and use of hypnosis, the effective result of applying the rule is per
se inadmissibility. The adoption of this rule thus becomes one of per se inadmissibility for
all HRT. In both the credibility and reliability approaches, the trial court is not required to,
nor is it permitted to, consider the admissibility of HRT, since both are per se rules. (iii) The
safeguards test is an extension of the Frye test. Under this rule, a hypnotic session is
conducted under strict guidelines designed to insure that a legally sufficient level of
reliability is achieved in the hypnotic procedure. It is the trial court's duty to review the
circumstances surrounding the hypnotic session and to determine whether the guidelines
have been strictly complied with. If so, then the HRT is admissible. (iv) The relevancy
balancing test considers both the logical and legal relevancy of the HRT. In determining
admissibility under this approach, the trial court must determine the extent to which the
suggested guidelines have been followed in the conduct of the hypnotic procedure. This is
necessary because the probative value of HRT relies on both the reliability of the principle
of hypnosis and the hypnotic procedure itself. On a case-by-case basis, the trial court must
determine whether the probative value of the HRT outweighs the dangers of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misguidance of the jury. (v) Under the totality of
circumstances approach the trial court is charged with the responsibility of making a
determination of the extent to which prescribed safeguards surrounding the hypnotic
session were adhered to and to decide whether, in view of all the circumstances of the case,
the proposed testimony is sufficiently reliable to merit admission.
10 Unless otherwise indicated by the context in which they occur, "he" and "his" are used
generically throughout this Note to indicate both the female and male gender.
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had an interesting experience with the relationship between hypnosis
and a criminal proceeding. In 1962, in State v. Nebb,11 the Franklin
County Courthouse was the site of an apparent "first" in American
criminal jurisprudence. 12 In Nebb, out of the jury's presence, the defen-
dant took the stand, was hypnotized, and allowed to testify while actually
under hypnosis. The hypnotist, a psychiatrist, also took the stand as a
qualified expert and testified on the nature of hypnosis and the reliability
of hypnotic testimony. So compelling was this testimony that the prose-
cution subsequently elected to amend the indictment and the defendant
plead guilty to a lesser charge of manslaughter. What is important to
note about State v. Nebb is that, notwithstanding the novelty of using
hypnotic evidence in a criminal proceeding, both the hypnotic testi-
mony1 3 of the defendant and the testimony of the hypnotist were
admitted by stipulation. Consequently, the court was not asked, nor did
it undertake sua sponte, to question the admissibility of the hypnotic
testimony or its reliability.
Nearly twenty-two years would pass before the issue of the relationship
of hypnosis and a criminal proceeding would again surface in yet another
Ohio criminal trial. In 1984, the issue of the admissibility of hypnotically
refreshed testimony was placed squarely before the Court of Appeals for
Clermont County in State v. Weston.' 4 The defendant in Weston was
convicted of four counts of aggravated murder.15 Two of the witnesses
who gave identification testimony at trial had been hypnotized during
the investigation of the multiple slayings by Ohio State Highway Patrol
officers. 16 One witness was hypnotized nine days after the murders in an
attempt to "cause her to more accurately recall the physical attributes of
the individual" that she had observed at the home of the victims on the
1 No. 39,540 (C.P. Franklin County May 28, 1962).
12 See generally, Herman, The Use of Hypno-Induced Statements in Criminal Cases, 25
OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1964).
13 At this juncture, it is important to distinguish between "hypnotic" evidence or
testimony and "hypnotically refreshed" testimony as the terms are utilized in this Note.
"Hypnotic" evidence is that related by a person while actually in a hypnotic trance.
"Hypnotically refreshed" testimony is testimony given by a person in a normal waking state
after having undergone a hypnotic session. All the courts that have considered the issue of
the admissibility of "hypnotic" testimony concur in holding it inadmissible, whether offered
as the testimony of a witness under hypnosis or as some memorialization, audio or video
recording or transcript, of the statements made while the witness was actually in the
hypnotic trance. See, e.g., Emmett v. State, 232 Ga. 110, 115, 205 S.E.2d 231, 235 (1974);
Pearson v. State, 441 N.E.2d 468, 471 (Ind. 1982); State v. Pusch, 77 N.D. 860,
887- 88, 46 N.W.2d 508, 522 (1950); Jones v. State, 542 P.2d 1316, 1326-27 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1975); State v. Pierce, 263 S.C. 23, 30, 207 S.E.2d 414, 418 (1974); Greenfield v.
Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710, 715-16, 204 S.E.2d 414, 419 (1974).
14 16 Ohio App. 3d 279, 475 N.E.2d 805 (Clermont County 1984).
is Id. at 281, 475 N.E.2d at 808.
ie Id. at 280, 475 N.E.2d at 807.
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night of the crime. 17 The other witness, a police officer who had stopped
a vehicle believed to have been driven by the defendant, was hypnotized
in an "unsuccessful attempt to cause him to remember the license
number of the truck" and other details of the vehicle and the driver.'8 The
defendant appealed his conviction, citing as one error on appeal the
denial of his motion to suppress the in-court identification testimony of
the two previously hypnotized witnesses. 19
In a per curiam opinion, the Weston court evaluated three of the
currently utilized legal tests and reasoned that "hypnotically refreshed"
testimony would be admissible under certain circumstances. The test set
forth in Weston allows HRT to be admitted if the court determines that
certain safeguards have been followed during the hypnotic process, thus
rendering the post-hypnotic testimony sufficiently reliable to merit
admission. 20 Based upon the facts as presented at trial, the court
determined that the testimony of both witnesses was admissible.2 1
Had the Weston decision been handed down just a few weeks earlier, it
might have been the subject of some noteworthy dicta in an Ohio
Supreme Court decision rendered a mere three and one-half months
later. 22 In State v. Maurer,23 the Ohio Supreme Court only indirectly
addressed the issue of the admissibility in a criminal trial of the
testimony of a witness who had undergone pre-trial hypnosis. In an
appeal as of right from a capital conviction, the defendant in Maurer
challenged the trial court's admission of post-hypnotic testimony offered
by the prosecution, claiming that, because the witness' memories had
been refreshed by hypnosis during the investigation of the crime, the
admission of the witness' testimony violated his rights of due process,
confrontation, and effective assistance of counsel.24
In upholding the court of appeals' dismissal of the defendant's appeal,
the Ohio Supreme Court took a careful look at the particular facts 25 and
declined "to hold that a prior hypnotic session should necessarily render
a witness completely incompetent to testify at trial concerning events
17 Id.
18 Id., 475 N.E.2d at 807-08.
'9 Id. at 281, 475 N.E.2d at 808.
20 Id. at 287, 475 N.E.2d at 813.
21 Id. at 287-89, 475 N.E.2d at 813-15.
22 State v. Maurer, 15 Ohio St. 3d 239, 473 N.E.2d 768 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
2714 (1985).
23 Id.
24 Id. at 259, 473 N.E.2d at 787.
25 In Maurer, the defendant filed a pre-trial motion in limine questioning the admissi-
bility of testimony by state's witnesses that had been hypnotized prior to trial. Id. at 258,
473 N.E.2d at 787. The prosecution agreed at the hearing on the motion to limit the witness'
testimony to only their "pre-hypnotic recollections" and the trial court overruled the
motion. Id. Thus, since there was no hypnotically induced evidence introduced at trial, the
court was not in a position to rule on the admissibility of HRT.
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recalled independent of hypnosis." 26 Apparently, the court distinguished
between situations where the witness testified as to matters recalled
prior to hypnosis, as was the case in Maurer, and situations where the
witness testified to matters he recalled only after undergoing hypnosis. In
the former situation, the court felt that the effect of hypnosis, if any, was
best dealt with on cross-examination as a matter of credibility, agreeing
"that any credibility issue could properly be resolved by the trier of fact
and assigned weight appropriately."27 Because the record in Maurer, like
that in Nebb, did not "disclose any objection ... at trial concerning the
issue of hypnotic [hypnotically refreshed, as used herein] testimony," 28
there was no need for the supreme court to establish what standard was
to be applied in Ohio regarding the admissibiliy of hypnotically refreshed
testimony in criminal proceedings. The court's statements in Maurer
may then be considered as dicta in regard to this issue. Presumably,
because the Weston and Maurer cases were almost simultaneously
decided, the supreme court was deprived of the opportunity to indicate
how it would resolve any conflict between its "dicta" in Maurer and the
legal test adopted by the Weston court.
Although the supreme court has managed to avoid setting decisive
precedent on this issue in Maurer, it is only a matter of time until
someone, like the defendant in Weston, presents the issue squarely to the
court, in a manner that will require a definitive answer to the defen-
dant's challenge to the reliability of hypnotically refreshed testimony. It
is reasonable to assume that when that day comes, the court will need to
be well advised, giving careful consideration not only to its own dicta in
Maurer and to the decision in Weston, but to the various decisions handed
down in other jurisdictions as well.
With this in mind, this Note seeks to analyze the legal framework of
hypnosis as it has been dealt with in Ohio and in other jurisdictions, and
to recommend an approach to deciding the issue. To accomplish this, the
author has divided this Note into four sections. The first section will deal
with the controversy surrounding the applicability of hypnosis and the
hypnotic process to a legal proceeding. The second section focuses on the
legal tests currently in use by other jurisdictions. In the third section, the
existing legal tests will be evaluated as to their strengths and weak-
nesses. Finally, the fourth section will recommend the approach most
consistent with the applicable law in Ohio.
26 Id. at 259, 473 N.E.2d at 788.
27 Id. at 260, 473 N.E.2d at 788.
28 Id. at 259, 473 N.E.2d at 787.
[Vol. 34:665
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II. HYPNOSIS-THE CONTROVERSY
Hypnosis, like so many other scientific phenomena, seems to defy
precise definition.29 In State v. Brown,30 the state's expert witness, Dr.
Martin Reiser, a recognized expert in the area of hypnosis, testified that
hypnosis is "an altered state of consciousness which is characterized by
an increased focus of attention, a heightened state of mental concentra-
tion, and a decrease of focus and concern about peripheral, or surrounding
noises and stimuli."3 1 The defense expert, Dr. Bernard Diamond, another
authority in this field, defined hypnosis as "an artifically[sic] induced
state of altered conciousness characterized by increased suggestibility,
suspension of critical judgment and psychological and physical relax-
ation." 32 Thus, the courts are confronted with two recognized authori-
ties,3 3 espousing two divergent opinions; herein lies the basis of the
controversy.
The proponents of hypnosis equate memory with a videotape recording
of the events in one's life that are stored in compartments in the brain,
ready to be replayed as they were observed. 34 Inability to remember
events is said to be "simply an inability to retrieve stored information."
35
The theory is that hypnosis, due to its state of relaxation and heightened
concentration, facilitates bringing these recollections back to the con-
scious level where they are remembered and can be related. 36 The
proponents further contend that these memories "refreshed" by hypnosis
are as accurate as normal memory. They go on to stress, however, that
hypnosis is not a guarantor of truth.37
29 Hypnosis has been defined as an "artifically induced trancelike state ... in which the
subject is highly susceptible to suggestion, oblivious to all else, and responds readily to the
commands of the hypnotist." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 678 (5th unabr. lawyer's ed.
1982). This neutral definition, in terms of the question facing both the legal and scientific
communities, would seem to encompass the definitions of hypnosis put forth by the
proponents and the opponents of the use of HRT in criminal proceedings. See infra text
accompanying notes 31-33.
30 337 N.W.2d 138 (N.D. 1983) [hereinafter State v. Brown whenever necessary to
eliminate confusion with Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)].
31 Id. at 145.
32 id. at 143.
" These two men, along with Dr. Martin T. Orne, are the experts most involved in this
controversy, in that they are the ones most frequently quoted on the subject and most often
called to testify as experts. Dr. Reiser is a proponent of the use of HRT in criminal
proceedings, whereas Dr. Diamond appears to be per se opposed to its use or would confine
it to very strictly limited circumstances.
31 People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 57, 641 P.2d 775, 798, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 266,
modified, 31 Cal. 3d 918(a), 181 Cal. Rptr. at 273, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982).
" United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 1200 (5th Cir. 1984).
36 Note, People v. Shirley: The Use of Hypnotically Enhanced Testimony at Trial, 20 CAL.
W.L. REv. 332, 335 (1984).
" See State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d at 149. This proposition was well stated in State v.
1986]
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The opponents of the use of HRT reject the videotape theory and cite a
number of conditions associated with hypnosis that they contend render
testimony derived from a hypnotic session unreliable for use as legally
sufficient evidence in a criminal proceeding. Their five basic areas of
concern have been well stated to be: (1) hypersuggestiveness; (2)
hypercompliance; (3) confabulation; (4) jury misunderstanding of the
concept of hypnosis; and (5) unusually strong confidence by the hypno-
tized subject in his ability to recall events accurately. 38 Therefore, there
is a difference of opinion among the experts as to whether these problems
exist, or if existent, the extent to which they adversely influence the use
of HRT in a criminal trial.3s
The concern with hypersuggestiveness is based on the premise that a
hypnotized subject is said to be extremely sensitive to any suggestions
made to him during the hypnotic episode, and extends to suggestions that
he will be able to either recall fully afterwards or will continue to recall
further after the hypnotic session. It has also been said that this state of
heightened suggestibility is such that minimal cues, even non-verbal
"messages" and ones that may be unknown to either the hypnotist or the
subject, may serve to irreparably taint the recall.40
Hypercompliance is said to result from the subject's desire to please the
hypnotist.41 Thus, the subject may tend to "incorporate into his response
his notion of what is expected of him."42 It has been noted that this drive
to please may be very strong in the context of a criminal trial, since most
Hurd, when the court opined that the "purpose of using hypnosis is not to obtain the truth,
as a polygraph or 'truth serum' is supposed to do. Instead, hypnosis is employed as a means
of overcoming amnesia and restoring the memory of a witness." State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525,
538, 432 A.2d 86, 92 (1981).
" Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d 76, 82 (Fla, Dist. Ct. App. 1983) [hereinafter Brown v.
State whenever necessary to eliminate confusion with State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d 138
(N.D. 1983)]. The first three concerns of HRT deal with conditions stemming from the
hypnotic session itself and are said to so significantly influence the reliability of the
testimony as to make it unfit for use in a criminal trial. The last two, increased veracity
and jury misconception, arise after the hypnotic session and could result from the in-court
use of HRT.
" It appears, however, that there must be some credence to these claims since their
potential for adverse influence on HRT has been addressed by the courts that allow the use
of HRT as well as those that hold it inadmissible. See, e.g., Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 63-66, 641
P.2d at 802-03, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 270-72 (1982) (HRT inadmissible); Brown v. State, 426 So.
2d at 82 (HRT admissible); State v. Iwakiri, 106 Idaho 618,622-23,682 P.2d 571,575 (1984)
(HRT admissible); State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 695-96, 464 A.2d 1028, 1041 (1983) (HRT
inadmissible).
4' Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective Witness,
68 CALIF. L. REV. 313, 333 (1980)._
41 Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d at 83.
42 Hurd, 86 N.J. at 539, 432 A.2d at 93.
[Vol. 34:665
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people want to help fight crime, but is even stronger yet if the subject also
happens to be the victim.
43
Confabulation refers to a subject's tendency to fill in the gaps in his
memory in order to be able to "remember" a complete picture of the
occurence.44 This can be manifested by memory distortion or sheer
fantasy.45 It is said that no one, neither the hypnotist nor the subject, can
determine which recollections are accurate and which are manufac-
tured.46 The relation between hypercompliance and confabulation is said
to be such that it may be the desire to please the hypnotist that
contributes to the subject's memory distortion. If a subject wants to please
the hypnotist, it has been theorized that he will make up something to fill
in the gaps in his incomplete memory in order to fulfill what he feels is
expected of him.
47
The opponents also contend that due to an alleged misconception by the
general public of the nature of hypnosis, a fear arises that the jury will
view the HRT as absolutely true by equating the hypnotic process with a
"truth serum."4 In this context, it is said that the jury will place more
weight on HRT than on normal witness recall.4
9
The final purported problem with HRT is that of a supposed
"unshakeable" belief by the previously hypnotized witness that what he
is saying is the absolute truth. This has been attributed in part to the
hypnotic procedure in which the subject is told he will remember
"everything" about the occurence and in part to a phenomenon of
hypnosis known as "post-hypnotic source amnesia."50 It is said that a
subject who recalls a fact while under hypnosis cannot recall upon
awakening the source of that recollection and assumes it to be a product
of his actual experience. 51 Since the subject's belief in the accuracy of the
recollection is the same whether actual or manufactured it is said that
the recollection becomes essentially immune to effective cross examina-
tion.52 The concern here is that if cross examination is ineffective, then
43 Shirley, 31 Cal, 3d at 62 n.42, 641 P.2d at 801 n.42, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 270 n.42.
" Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d at 84.
45 Hurd, 86 N.J. at 538, 432 A.2d at 92.
4 See, e.g., id.; State v. Peoples, 311 N.C. 515, 523, 319 S.E.2d 177, 182 (1984).
47 Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d at 84.
41 Id. But see supra note 37 and accompanying text. This alleged misconception of
hypnosis by the public can be dealt with in the criminal trial setting by the use of
cautionary jury instructions whenever HRT is admitted at trial. See infra note 166.
4' Note, The Admissibility of Testimony Influenced by Hypnosis, 67 VA. L. REv. 1203,
1222 (1981).
so Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 65-66, 641 P.2d at 803-04, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 272.
5' Id. at 65, 641 P.2d at 804, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 272.
12 Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 105, 436 A.2d 170, 174 (1981).
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infringement of the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation may
exist.5 3
Notwithstanding all of the alleged problems with the use of HRT in
criminal proceedings, most courts do recognize the importance of hypno-
sis as an investigatory aid in law enforcement. 54 This seems to be due to
the fact that investigatory leads derived by hypnosis are left to verifica-
tion and an investigator is not concerned with the immediate evaluation
of the truthfulness of the statements as in courtroom testimony. 5
5
As can readily be seen, due to the divergence of scientific opinion on
hypnosis and the hypnotic process, and their purported effect on post-
hypnotic testimony, it is no wonder that there is no single consistent legal
rule throughout the jurisdictions regarding the use of HRT in criminal
proceedings. In addition, each jurisdiction is faced with its own inherent
legal considerations related to the use of any proffered evidence, includ-
ing HRT.
There are many conflicting, often contrary, non-scientific factors the
courts must consider in resolving this issue, such as: (1) the proper role of
the trial court in determining the admissibility of such testimony; (2) the
concern for judicial efficiency and consistency if the trial courts are left to
make this determination; (3) the ability of the jury to justly weigh its
significance; and (4) the possible infringement of a defendant's constitu-
tional right to confrontation; all as balanced against the rights of the
people to due process of law and their interest in the fair and effective
administration of criminal justice. The variation in the ultimate deter-
mination of this issue by the courts which have addressed HRT seems
best explained by a consideration of the judicial policy5 6 underlying any
53 See, e.g., State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 232, 624 P.2d 1274, 1280 (1981); Shirley, 31
Cal. 3d at 66, 641 P.2d at 804, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 272; Peoples, 311 N.C. at 526, 319 S.E.2d
at 184. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
54 See, e.g., State ex rel Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982);
Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 67, 641 P.2d at 805, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 273.
5 Collins, 132 Ariz. at 209, 644 P.2d at 1295.
5 See, e.g., id. at 196, 644 P.2d at 1282; House v. State, 445 So. 2d 815 (Miss. 1984). In
House, the Supreme Court of Mississippi began consideration of the issue of HRT with a
statement of policy. House, 445 So. 2d at 818. The court stated that they "eschew[ed] per se
inadmissibility rules wherever possible," were "committed to the proposition that all
credible evidence that will assist the jury in its fact-finding task ought, if put in proper form,
be admissible" and that they favored inclusion as being "consistent with the correct
administration of justice." Id. at 818-19. They stressed however that there must be
"vigilance against forms of evidence with the potential for mischief and injustice." Id. at
819. In State ex rel Collins v. Superior Court, the court stated that the decision on the use
of HRT involves, to a great extent, the resolution of a single issue of policy, whether the Frye
test of "general acceptance" for the admissibility of scientific evidence should be applied to
hypnosis and hypnotically refreshed testimony. Collins, 132 Ariz. at 196, 644 P.2d at 1282.
It follows then, at least in the opinion of this court, that the decision on the use of HRT
would not turn on the prospective value of HRT, but rather on the individual court's
[Vol. 34:665
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individual jurisdiction's decision. It is against this background, scientific
and non-scientific, that the various legal tests must be studied and
evaluated.
III. LEGAL TESTS
A. Credibility Test
The credibility test was first espoused in the leading case of Harding v.
State,5 7 in which the court held that the testimony of a prosecution
witness whose memory had been refreshed by a pre-trial hypnotic session
was sufficient to support the jury's verdict.58 In Harding, the defendant
was indicted and convicted of assault with intent to rape and assault with
intent to murder. 59 His conviction for the rape charge rested in part on
the testimony of the victim, who had undergone hypnosis administered
by a psychologist approximately one month after the incident in order to
aid her in remembering a more complete picture of the events of the
crime. 60 Before the hypnotic session, the victim knew and related to the
police the identity of the person that had shot her, but was unable to
recall events subsequent to the shooting, including the time of the alleged
rape.61 While under hypnosis, the victim was able to recall those events
that occurred after the shooting, including identification of the defendant
as being involved in the sexual attack as well as the shooting. At trial,
she testified as to those events and to the fact that she was "doing so from
her own recollection. '62
After conviction, the defendant appealed and challenged the admission
of the post-hypnotic testimony of the victim and the testimony of the
hypnotist.63 The Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed the convic-
tion for rape on the basis of the witness' hypnotically refreshed testimony,
the testimony of the hypnotist who stated that there was no reason to
doubt the truth of the witness' testimony and in light of other corrobo-
rating evidence. 64 The Harding court ruled that the fact of hypnosis
"concerns the question of the weight of the evidence which the trier-of-
determination of the exact meaning and scope of the rule laid down by the Frye court. See
infra text accompanying notes 85-89.
57 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969) (overruled by
State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 464 A.2d 1028 (1983)).
58 Id. at 236, 246, 246 A.2d at 306, 312.
59 Id. at 232, 246 A.2d at 304.
60 Id. at 234, 246 A.2d at 305.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 236, 246 A.2d at 306.
63 Id. at 235, 246 A.2d at 306.
4 Id. at. 247, 246 A.2d at 312.
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fact, in this case the jury, must decide. '65 This approach has been and is
currently followed in many jurisdictions. 66
Under this approach, memory refreshed by hypnosis is compared to the
recall stimulated by seeing a document, for instance, and is equated to
present recollection refreshed. Present recollection refreshed "involves
allowing the witness to consult some stimulus that revives his weakened
memory, thereby enabling him to later testify from present recollection to
matters which he had temporarily been unable to recall." 67 This concept
is said to be the general reasoning of the courts that have adopted the
credibility approach. 68 Further, under this rationale, the conclusion is
that skillful cross examination will enable the jury to evaluate the effect
of hypnosis on the witness and his proffered testimony.69
It is interesting to note that the federal jurisdiction having had the
most experience with this issue, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, also
holds that the fact of pre-trial hypnosis goes to the credibility but not the
admissibility of the testimony.7u However, in United States v. Adams,7 1
while holding that HRT is per se admissible, the court did recognize that
hypnotically refreshing a witness' memory "carries a dangerous potential
for abuse" and that care must be taken to insure that a witness'
statements are the product of his own memory.7 2
By definition, the credibility approach has been rejected by the propo-
nents of the remaining four tests, which concur that pre-trial hypnosis
does affect the competency of the witness to testify. The credibility
approach was criticized in State v. Mena 73 and State u. Mack7 4 as being
65 Id. at 236, 246 A.2d at 306.
66 United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979);
United States v. Adams, 581 F.2 193 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978); United
States v. Waksal, 539 F. Supp. 834 (S.D. Fla. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 709 F.2d 653
(11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1977); State v.
Contreras, 674 P.2d 794 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983), rev'd, 718 P.2d 792 (Alaska 1986); Clark v.
State, 379 So. 2d 372 (Fa. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Creamer v. State, 232 Ga. 136, 205 S.E.2d
240 (1974); State v. Wren, 425 So. 2d 756 (La. 1983); Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 246
A.2d 302 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969); State v. Greer, 609 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1980); State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d 138 (N.D. 1983); State v. Jorgensen, 8 Or. App. 1,
492 P.2d 312 (1971); Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280 (Wyo. 1982).
17 Perry, The Trend Toward Exclusion of Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony - Has the
Right Question Been Asked?, 31 U. KA. L. REv. 579, 580 n.3 (1983).
68 Hurd, 86 N.J. at 535, 432 A.2d at 91.
69 State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d at 151.
70 See supra notes 2, 66. A comparison of the federal cases cited supra note 2 with the
federal courts advocating the credibility approach as found supra note 66 shows the Ninth
Circuit to have most frequently addressed this issue and to advocate the credibility
approach.
7 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978).
72 Id. at 198-99.
71 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274 (1981).
74 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980).
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unresponsive to the then current scientific knowledge regarding hypno-
sis. It has been faulted on the ground that it is too simplistic to view
memory refreshed by hypnosis in the same way as memory refreshed by
consulting a document.7 5
The opponents of the credibility test maintain that because HRT is per
se admissible under this approach, and due to the purported problems
with HRT, it is not possible for the jury to properly assess the credibility
of the witness or the weight to be given his testimony if it has been
influenced by suggestion and confabulation and is presented by the
witness as totally accurate information in an unshakeable manner.
Possibly the most significant consideration of the influence of purported
suggestion, confabulation and increased veracity of the previously hyp-
notized witness' testimony is its effect on the defendant's constitutional
right to confrontation.
If cross examination is presumed to be of primary importance in the
adequate exercise of the right of confrontation and if a previous hypnotic
session adversely influences a witness' susceptibility to cross examina-
tion, then there may be an infringement upon this right.76 It is argued
that if the previously hypnotized witness has the purported increased
belief in the truthfulness of his testimony, whether it is accurate or not,
then the jury will be more apt to see a confident, self-assured witness and
thus will be unable to determine credibility by viewing the witness'
conduct, appearance and demeanor because it is likely that the witness
will not exhibit signs of hesitancy, nervousness, and self-doubt on cross
examination. 77 However, in State v. Armstrong,7s the court held that if
the defendant was given the opportunity to cross examine the witness
and was permitted to introduce testimony on the witness' pre-hypnotic
recollection and the effect hypnosis may have on memory, then the
defendant's right to confrontation was satisfied.79
7' Haward & Ashworth, Some Problems ofEvidence Obtained by Hypnosis, 1980 CRAM. L.
REV. 469, 474-75 (Sweet & Maxwell 1980).
76 See, e.g., Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 66, 641 P.2d at 804, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 272;Peoples, 311
N.C. at 526, 319 S.E.2d at 184.
71 It has been noted that this same type of self-assuredness can also occur in witnesses
that have not been hypnotized. The court in State v. Hurd stated, in reference to
non-hypnotized witnesses, that a "false confidence in the details of one's memory, especially
when it satisfies a personal need to know and is reinforced through repeated interrogation,
imparts an impression of credibility to the jury.... Hurd, 86 N.J. at 542, 432 A.2d at 95.
In State v. Brown, Dr. Martin Reiser testified that, in his opinion, "the literature is quite
clear on eyewitness testimony generally, that after a certain number of reviews without
hypnosis of going through a crime event a person may become more sure of the recall at the
end of that multi- review process than before." State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d at 145.
78 110 Wis. 2d 555, 329 N.W.2d 386, cert. denied, 461 US. 946 (1983).
71 Id. at 570, 329 N.W.2d at 394. The courts that have addressed the issue of the
admissibility of HRT have specifically, and not so specifically, addressed the question of
whether such admission impermissibly interferes with a defendant's right to confrontation
1986]
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It is also important to note that both Maryland and North Carolina,
which had previously followed the credibility approach, have now aban-
doned it and opted for adoption of the reliability test. This reversal of
position, from per se admissibility to per se inadmissibility, is indicative
of both the significance of the controversy surrounding this issue and the
tremendously unsettled state of the law regarding it. The Court of
Appeals of Maryland adopted the reliability approach in State v. CollinssO
and in so doing removed the shroud of acceptance from the credibility test
of the Harding court. The Supreme Court of North Carolina overruled its
decision in State v. McQueen,81 which allowed HRT, by its holding in State
v. Peoples.8 2 The Collins court simply "adopted the Frye test as the basis
for evaluation of testimony where a witness has been hypnotized."8 3 In
Peoples, the court stated that a major reason for their adoption of the
credibility test was the holding in Harding and with that precedent
removed and in light of the current scientific controversy regarding
hypnosis, McQueen was overruled. 84
B. Reliability Test
The backbone of the reliability test is the Frye test8 5 for the admissi-
bility of scientific evidence. The majority of jurisdictions that follow this
as guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the Constitution and made applicable to the
states by the fourteenth amendment. Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968); Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). As with the rest of the questions regarding the use of HRT, the
courts have arrived at differing conclusions in regard to this inquiry as well.
In State v. Hurd, the court determined that, since the proponent had the burden of proving
by "clear and convincing" evidence that the HRT was admissible, it would be "difficult to
imagine an identification would violate due process once the court has determined that the
testimony satisfies the more stringent standard for reliability" embodied in the safeguards
approach to determining the admissibility of HRT. Hurd, 86 N.J. at 548, 432 A.2d at 98.
In State v. Weston, in adopting a "substantial compliance" safeguards test, the court
specifically addressed the issue of a possible violation of the defendant's right to confron-
tation. The court held that if there has been substantial compliance with the recommended
safeguards, then the "accused's right of confrontation is preserved," because "witnesses that
have not been subjected to pretrial hypnosis are often falsely confident about their
testimony" and, further, witnesses are "commonly 'rehearsed' prior to trial to enhance their
'credibility'." Weston, 16 Ohio App. 3d at 289, 475 N.E.2d at 815. But see McQueen v.
Garrison, 617 F. Supp. 633 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (holding that the sixth amendment does not
demand per se exclusion of all testimony by a previously hypnotized witness, but it does bar
the use of any testimony concerning matters not recalled prior to the hypnotic session).
so 296 Md. 670, 464 A.2d 1028 (1983).
si 295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1978).
82 311 N.C. 515, 319 S.E.2d 177 (1984).
1 Collins, 296 Md. at 681, 464 A.2d at 1034.
1 Peoples, 311 N.C. at 532, 319 S.E.2d at 187.
" Frye v. United States, 293 F 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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approach have decided that hypnosis is a scientific procedure, and as such
that it falls under the purview of the Frye standard.
8 6
In Frye, the court held expert testimony, offered by the defendant,
concerning results obtained by the use of a "systolic blood pressure
deception" test8 7 inadmissible, stating that "while the courts will go a
long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well recognized
scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is
made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance
in the particular field in which it belongs."8 8 Thus, the courts that have
adopted this approach are of the opinion that the underlying principle of
hypnosis is not, according to the weight of the scientific evidence,
"generally accepted" as reliable in the scientific community in which it
exists. The reliability approach is then a rule of per se inadmissibility.8 9
If a witness has been hypnotized before trial in order to refresh his
recollection of the occurence, for whatever reason, then, because hypnosis
6 The following courts have held hypnosis and HRT inadmissible as not meeting the
Frye test for admissibility of scientific evidence: Prewitt v. State, 460 So. 2d 296 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1984); State v. Contreras, 718 P.2d 792 (Alaska 1986); State ex rel Collins v. Superior
Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982); State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274
(1981); People v. Guerra, 37 Cal. 3d 385, 690 P.2d 635, 208 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1984); People v.
Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18,641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, modified, 31 Cal. 3d 918(a), 181 Cal.
Rptr. at 273, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982); People v. Quintanar, 659 P.2d 710 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1982); State v. Atwood, 39 Conn- Supp. 273, 479 A.2d 258 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984);
State v. Davis, 490 A.2d 601 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985); Peterson v. State, 448 N.E.2d 673 (Ind.
1983); State v. Haislip, 237 Kan. 461, 701 P.2d 909, cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 575 (1985); State
v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 464 A.2d 1028 (1983); Commomwealth v. Kater, 388 Mass. 519,447
N.E.2d 1190 (1983); People v. Gonzales, 415 Mich. 615, 329 N.W.2d 743 (1982), modified,
417 Mich. 968, 336 N.W.2d 751 (1983); State v. Ture, 353 N.W.2d 502 (Minn. 1984); State
v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980); State v. Levering, 213 Neb. 686, 331 N.W.2d 500
(1983); People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 453 N.E.2d 484, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1983); State v.
Peoples, 311 N.C. 515, 319 S.E.2d 177 (1984); Harmon v. State, 700 P.2d 212 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1985); Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 436 A.2d 170 (1981); State v. Pierce,
263 S.C. 23,207 S.E.2d 414 (1974); Burnett v. State, 642 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982);
Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710, 204 S.E.2d 414 (1974); State v. Martin, 101
Wash. 2d 713, 684 P.2d 651 (1984); State v. Laureano, 101 Wash. 2d 745, 682 P.2d 889
(1984). Additionally, the following states have adopted a per se rule of inadmissibility for
HRT without specifically adopting the Frye test: Rock v. State, 288 Ark. 566, 708 S.W.2d 78,
cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 430 (1986); Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1985); Walraven v.
State, 255 Ga. 276, 336 S.E.2d 798 (1985) (Gregory, J., concurring specially); State v.
Moreno, ___Haw. -, 709 P.2d 103 (1985).
" The device used to conduct the "systolic blood pressure deception" test is considered
a forerunner of the modern "lie detector". Weston, 16 Ohio App. 3d at 283, 475 N.E.2d at
810.
88 Frye, 293 F. at 1014 (emphasis added).
" Those courts that have recently adopted this approach, without specifically adopting
the Frye rule, agree that HRT should be per se inadmissible notwithstanding the applica-
bility of the Frye standard. See, e.g., Rock v. State, 288 Ark. 566, 708 S.W.2d 78, cert.
granted, 107 S. Ct. 430 (1986); Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1985); Walraven v. State,
255 Ga. 276, 336 S.E.2d 798 (1985); State v. Moreno, ____Haw. -, 709 P.2d 103 (1985).
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is deemed unreliable as a scientific process under the Frye test of "general
acceptance," all subsequent testimony by that previously hypnotized
witness is inadmissible. This approach has the "advantage" of eliminat-
ing the possible problems associated with hypnosis or the hypnotic
session by simply eliminating all testimony that could have been influ-
enced by hypnosis, no matter how material or reliable it could be shown
to be.
A number of the courts that have adopted this per se rule have felt the
need to make concessions to the harshness of its application. 90 Most
courts have ruled, subsequent to its initial adoption, that a previously
hypnotized witness is competent to testify to that which was known prior
to the hypnotic session.91 It is also interesting to note that two of the
states instrumental in the trend toward the reliability approach have
now allowed an exception to the rule whereby the defendant is permitted
to testify after being hypnotized and does not appear to be held only to
testimony on his proven pre-hypnotic statements. The Shirley court
modified their original decision to allow a previously hypnotized defen-
dant to testify in his own behalf.92 In State v. Superior Court,9 3 the
Arizona Court of Appeals allowed a previously hypnotized defendant to
testify when denial of such testimony would have precluded the defen-
dant's only defense.
90 Under a strict interpretation, this test could produce the ludicrous result wherein a
victim, who was also the only witness to the crime, would be precluded from testifying at
trial even to the fact that the crime occurred, simply by virtue of having undergone a
hypnotic session prior to the trial during the criminal investigation. See, e.g., State v.
Brown, 337 N.W.2d at 149.
91 See, e.g., Collins, 132 Ariz. at 209, 644 P.2d at 1295; People v. Zamarripa, 174 Cal.
App. 3d 595, 220 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1985); People v. Rex, 689 P.2d 669 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984);
State v. Collins, 296 Md. at 702, 464 A.2d at 1044; People v. Perry, 126 Mich. App. 86, 337
N.W.2d 324 (1983); State v. Ture, 353 N.W.2d 502 (Minn. 1984); State v. Levering, 213 Neb.
715, 331 N.W.2d 505 (1983); Commonwealth v. Smoyer, 505 Pa. 83, 476 A.2d 1304 (1984);
State v. Laureano, 101 Wash. 2d 745, 682 P.2d 889 (1984). By allowing a previously
hypnotized witness to testify to those things the witness "knew" prior to the hypnotic
session these courts have shown that, at the least, they have recognized the tremendous
potential for a loss of relevant, material, and reliable evidence and the needs of the system
for all such evidence. However, this concession also serves to significantly undermine one of
these courts' primary reasons for holding HRT per se inadmissible and to emphasize the
impracticality of using such a rigid rule. These courts purport to be concerned with the
possible violation of a defendant's right to confrontation that could result from a supposed
inadequacy of meaningful cross-examination due to the possibility that a witness attains an
increased veracity in the truthfulness of his testimony after being hypnotized. If this is so,
how then can they, in good faith and in keeping with their purported concern, allow a
previously hypnotized witness to testify at all, since it would seem that the witness would
also have the same increased veracity, and the same possibility for infringing a defendant's
rights, when his testimony concerns only his "known" pre-hypnotic memories.
92 People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, modified, 31 Cal.
3d 918(a), 181 Cal. Rptr. at 273, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982).
93 142 Ariz. 375, 690 P.2d 94 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).
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The reliability approach is not without its critics. The Hurd court
stated that "we believe that a rule of per se inadmissibility is unneces-
sarily broad and will result in the exclusion of evidence that is as
trustworthy as other eyewitness testimony. ' '9
The basic premise on which the reliability approach rests has also been
the subject of criticism. It was well stated by the Valdez court that the
Frye test applies to the "admissibility of expert opinion and experimental
data. The issue here is not the admissibility of a hypnotist's observations
or statements made by the witness during hypnosis but instead the
admissibility of the testimony of a lay witness in a normal, waking
state."95
C. Safeguards Test
The safeguards approach as set out in State v. Hurd96 is an extension of
the Frye rule concept of admissibility. The Hurd court adopted the Frye
standard and reasoned that hypnosis itself need not be "generally
accepted" as a means to restore accurate memory, but rather "hypnosis
can be considered reasonably reliable if it is able to yield recollections as
accurate as those of an ordinary eyewitness, which likewise are often
historically inaccurate."97 On this basis the court determined that
"hypnosis to refresh memory satisfies the Frye standard in certain
instances." 98
In Hurd, the defendant was indicted on charges of assault with intent
to kill, possession of and assault with a deadly weapon, and breaking and
entering with intent to assault.99 It appears that the indictment was
based almost exclusively on the statement of the victim, the defendant's
ex-wife, which was given to police approximately one month after the
attack, a time that was also six days after the victim had been hypnotized
in an attempt to get her to recall details of the incident.100 It also appears
that prior to the hypnotic session the victim was not able to recall any
details about the attacker, either immediately after the incident or for
the following three and one-half weeks.1Ol
The hypnotic session involving this victim was conducted by a psychi-
atrist, at the suggestion of the prosecutor, and attended by two police
94 Hurd, 86 NJ. at 541, 432 A.2d at 94.
11 Valdez, 722 F.2d at 1200-01; accord, Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d at 89; State v. Brown,
337 N.W.2d at 151; Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d at 567, 329 N.W.2d at 393. See supra text
accompanying note 88.
9- 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981).
97 Id. at 538, 432 A.2d at 92.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 532, 432 A.2d at 89.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 530, 432 A.2d at 88.
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officers who were allowed to question the witness while she was under
hypnosis.10 2 It was shown at the pre-trial hearing on the defendant's
motion to suppress the post-hypnotic identification testimony of the
victim that during the hypnotic session numerous strong, almost coer-
cive, "suggestions" were made to the witness that she should remember
details of the incident. 10 3
The trial court granted the defendant's motion to suppress and the
State, after denial of its motion to appeal the trial court order, sought
and received leave to appeal the lower courts' orders. 0 4 In affirming the
trial court's order, the Supreme Court of New Jersey set out the
requirements of the safeguards test and determined that on the facts
the post-hypnotic testimony of the witness did not meet those
requirements.
The court recognized both the alleged problems associated with
HRT and its concern with a potential loss of important evidence. In
balancing these factors it arrived at an approach that would allow HRT
if certain guidelines 0 5 were followed in the hypnotic procedure that
increased the reliability of HRT to that of normal eyewitness
testimony.1 0 6
If compliance with these safeguards has been met, it is the burden of
the proponent to establish by clear and convincing evidence the admis-
sibility of the HRT.1O 7 This approach has been followed in several
102 Id. at 530-31, 432 A.2d at 88-89.
103 Id. at 531, 432 A.2d at 89.
104 Id. at 533-34, 432 A.2d at 90.
105 The guidelines adopted by the court were first suggested by Dr. Martin Orne, a
leading authority on hypnosis, and are as follows:
First, a psychiatrist or psychologist experienced in the use of hypnosis must
conduct the session ....
Second, the professional conducting the hypnotic session should be independent
of and not regularly employed by the prosecutor, defense, or investigator.
Third, any information given to the hypnotist by law enforcement personnel or
the defense prior to the hypnotic session must be recorded in writing or in other
suitable form ....
Fourth, before conducting hypnosis the hypnotist should obtain from the subject
a detailed description of the facts as the subject remembers them ....
Fifth, all contacts between the hypnotist and the subject must be recorded. This
will establish a record of the pre-induction interview, the hypnotic session and the
post-hypnotic period, enabling a court to determine what information or sugges-
tions the witness may have received ....
Sixth, only the hypnotist and the subject should be present during any phase of
the hypnotic session, including the pre-hypnotic testing and the post- hypnotic
interview ....
Id. at 545-46, 432 A.2d at 96-97.
106 Id. at 538, 432 A.2d at 92.
107 id. at 546-47, 432 A.2d at 97.
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jurisdictions, including Illinois,108 Mississippi, 10 9 New Mexico110 and
Tennessee."1 '
In House v. State,112 the court determined that HRT would be admis-
sible if the trial court determined in an advance in camera hearing that
there had been "substantial compliance" with the mandatory guidelines
and that the "probative value of a victim's hypnotically refreshed
memory outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice to the accused." 113
The proponents of both the credibility 11 and reliability 1 5 tests have
criticized the Hurd approach. The primary disadvantages are said to be
judicial inefficiency and the production of conflicting results in different
trial courts when the guidelines are applied by the individual courts on a
case-by-case basis."l 6 It has also been said that when the trial court
deems the testimony admissible, such admission might have the adverse
effect of giving the HRT, in the eyes of the jury, "an aura of reliability
which, in actuality, it does not possess."" l7 The guidelines themselves
108 People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App. 3d 379, 385 N.E.2d 848 (1979).
109 House v. State, 445 So. 2d 815 (Miss. 1984).
110 State v. Hutchinson, 99 N.M. 616, 661 P.2d 1315 (1983); State v. Beachum, 97 N.M.
682, 643 P.2d 246 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981).
11' State v. Glebock, 616 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981).
112 445 So. 2d 815 (Miss. 1984). In House, the defendant was indicted and convicted of
unnatural intercourse with an eight- year-old girl. Id. at 817. His conviction seems to have
rested entirely on the post-hypnotic testimony of the victim and the testimony of the
hynotist, who was allowed to testify both as to what the subject told him about the alleged
offense and his expert opinion regarding the fact that the victim was telling the truth. Id.
at 818-19. There was no other "independent, objective verification" of the charges against
the defendant. Id. at 818. Further, the alleged incident that gave rise to the indictment was
not the first time that this victim had made such accusations against this defendant and
other individuals. After determining that the testimony of the hypnotist constituted
reversible error on the grounds of impermissible hearsay, holding that the testimony
concerning what the victim told him in regard to the alleged incident constituted hearsay
and that an opinion as to the truthfulness of the victim's statements was not a proper
subject on which to render a permissible expert opinion, the court then proceeded to
determine the rule of law to be applied to HRT. The court reasoned that, because the case
had to be remanded, the trial court would still need guidance as to the hypnotically
refreshed testimony of the victim. Id. at 820-23. After a consideration of the "relevant legal
and psychological authority" the court declined to adopt a per se rule of inadmissibility and
set out the requirements of the test to be utilized in Mississippi. Id. at 823-27.
"3 Id. at 827.
114 See, e.g., State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d at 151.
5 See, e.g., Collins, 132 Ariz. at 208, 644 P.2d at 1294; Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 39-40, 641
P.2d at 787, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 255-56.
.16 Collins, 132 Ariz. at 208, 644 P.2d at 1294; Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 39, 641 P.2d at 787,
181 Cal. Rptr. at 255; State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d at 151.
117 People v. Gonzales, 108 Mich. App. 145, 160, 310 N.W.2d 306, 313 (1981), af'd, 415
Mich. 615, 329 N.W.2d 743 (1982).
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have been criticized for failing to provide the requisite level of assurance
of reliability and for being unworkable. 118
D. Relevancy Balancing Test
In Brown v. State," 9 the court put forth the relevancy balancing test to
determine the admissibility of HRT.12o The court determined that the
Frye test was not applicable and that the relevancy balancing approach
was consistent with Florida Evidence Code, Sections 90.401, 90.402, and
11 Collins, 132 Ariz. at 186-87, 644 P.2d at 1272; Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d at 544, 484 N.E.2d
at 495, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 266.
119 426 So. 2d 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). In Brown v. State, the defendant was indicted
and convicted on charges of forgery, uttering a forged instrument, and grand theft. Id. at 78.
The incident leading to the indictments involved the cashing of checks that had been stolen
and forged. The prosecution felt that a conviction for uttering a forged instrument would be
nearly impossible to prove without the testimony of the bank teller identifying the
defendant as the individual who had cashed the the check, but the teller's recollection of the
identity of the person had faded in the intervening two years between the occurence and the
time of the trial. The teller was hypnotized four days before trial "in an effort to assist her
in refreshing her faded memory" of the day of the crime. Id. at 79. The day before trial the
defendant moved for a continuance on the grounds that the short notice of the proposed use
of the testimony was prejudicial. This motion was denied and the defendant was subse-
quently convicted. Id.
On appeal, the Florida District Court of Appeals reversed the convictions for uttering a
forged instrument and grand theft due to the prejudice resulting from the lack of effective
notice of the proposed use of the hypnotically refreshed testimony. Id. at 81. Because the
court realized that the issue of the use of the testimony would again arise at trial they set
forth the relevancy balancing test to be utilized by the trial court in determining whether
the testimony of the previously hypnotized witness was admissible and remanded the case
to the trial court for proceedings consistent with their opinion. Id. at 94.
120 In 1985 the Supreme Court of Florida, in Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1985)
[hereinafter Bundy Il], held HRT to be per se inadmissible. They did so without comment
on the reasoning of the Florida Court of Appeals in Brown v. State. The Bundy H court
simply stated that they were "swayed by the opinions of the courts of other jurisdictions
that have held that the concerns surrounding the reliability of hypnosis warrant a holding
that this mechanism, like polygraph and truth serum results, has not been proven
sufficiently reliable by experts in the field .. a.." Bundy H, 471 So. 2d at 18 (emphasis
added). It should be remembered that the proponents of the use of HRT do not hold it out as
a guarantor of truth. Therefore, if the Bundy H court is relying on the lack of a
"truth-determining" component to HRT as a basis for holding it per se inadmissible, then
the holding of this case becomes even more suspect because the proponents of the use of
HRT have not held hypnosis out as a device for determining the truthfulness of a witness'
statements. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. Further, it was noted in a
concurring opinion that "the majority's rule of per se inadmissibility is merely an advisory
opinion to the courts of Florida because it is not necessary to apply the rule" to decide the
defendant's appeal on the specific facts of the case as presented. Id. at 24 (Boyd, C.J.,
concurring specially). For these reasons, the thoughtful analysis of the court in Brown v.
State, and possibly the current law of the jurisdiction as well, would seem to remain intact
as suggested by the concurring opinion.
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90.403, which were patterned after Rules 401,402, and 403 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.121
The court stated that there are two kinds of relevancy, logical and
legal. They went on to state that "'[tlhe relevancy of a fact to the issue
being tried is ordinarily a question of logic rather than one of law"' and
that "'relevant evidence is evidence tending to prove or disprove a
material fact.' '"122 However, even if evidence is logically relevant it may
not be admissible if it is not legally relevant.123 Their test for legal
relevance states that "'[r]elevant evidence is inadmissible if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, misleading the jury or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence .... 24
The court in Brown v. State reasoned that because the probative value
of HRT relies on both the principle of hypnosis and the hypnotic
procedure, the circumstances of the particular hypnotic session itself,
the trial court must decide its admissibility on a case-by-case basis. 25
The trial court must determine if the proffered testimony is logically
relevant and whether adequate safeguards have been followed to meet
the test of legal relevancy.126 In recognizing the supposed problems
associated with HRT, the court placed the burden of proving the legal
relevancy, and hence admissibility, of the HRT on the party advocating
its admission.127
The guidelines advocated by the court, in Brown v. State, to reduce the
potential for prejudice that could be enhanced by the supposed problems
121 FLA. STAT. §§ 90.401, 90.402, 90.403 (1979); FED. R. EVID. 401, 402, 403.
122 Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d at 88 (citing 23 FLA. JUR. 2D Evidence and Witnesses § 123
(1980) and FLA. STAT. § 90.401 (1979)).
123 Id.
124 Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (1979)).
125 Id. at 90.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 91. The court in Brown v. State adopted the language of the Hurd court in
regard to this burden of proof. Id. In the words of the Hurd court:
[Tihe party seeking to introduce hypnotically refreshed testimony has the
burden of establishing admissibility by clear and convincing evidence. We
recognize that this standard places a heavy burden upon the use of hypnosis for
criminal trial purposes. This burden is justified by the potential for abuse of
hypnosis, the genuine likelihood of suggestiveness and error, and the consequent
risk of injustice. Hypnotically refreshed testimony must not be used where it is
not reasonably likely to be accurate evidence.
Hurd, 86 N.J. at 547, 432 A.2d at 97; accord, Beachum, 97 N.M. at 690, 643 P.2d at 254. In
Brown v. State, the court then went on to state that the party advocating admission should
attempt to comply with the suggested guidelines for conducting the hypnotic session and
that the higher the level of compliance, "the more reliable and less suggestive" the hypnotic
session could be shown to be by the party seeking admission of the HRT. Brown v. State, 426
So. 2d at 91. Further, it was their opinion that "[ulse of these extensive safeguards can
minimize the gravity of objections to admissibility." Id.
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of hypersuggestiveness, hypercompliance and confabulation associated
with the hypnotic procedure are as follows: 125
First, a neutral and detached hypnotist should be employed...
Use of a police officer/hypnotist is not per se a compelling reason
for a court to supress automatically. . . on prejudicial grounds....
A second safeguard involves the location of the hypnosis
session. Ideally, the session should be conducted at an indepen-
dent location, such as a doctor's office, free from a coercive or
suggestive atmosphere....
Third,... only the hypnotist and the witness should be present
during hypnosis. 129
A recommended fourth safeguard proposes that the subject,
before the hypnosis session, be examined by the hypnotist in an
effort to elicit every possible detail that the witness recalls
concerning the crime. This procedure should be recorded in some
fashion .... 130
128 Id. at 91-93.
129 The first three procedural guidelines and the seventh guideline suggested by the
court are aimed at decreasing the potential for any unwanted and unnecessary "coercive-
ness" or bias in the hypnotic procedure and directly address the problems of hypersuggest-
ibility, hypercompliance, and confabulation. A "neutral and detatched hypnotist" indepen-
dent of either the prosecution or the defense would serve to decrease the potential for bias
towards either party in the conduct of the session. The court would not require that the
hypnotist necessarily be a psychiatrist; however, as determined by the Hurd court, perhaps
this would be the better approach. Hurd, 87 N.J. at 545, 432 A.2d at 96. As noted by the
Brown court, the hypnotist should then be able to qualify more readily as an expert and
testify as to the procedure employed in the particular case and as to hypnosis in general.
Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d at 91. In addition, if the hypnotist were also a psychiatrist, he
would seem to be more qualified to comment on the reason for memory loss and the
appropriateness of the use of hypnosis in this particular case. Further, he would be able to
conduct a physical, as well as a mental, examination of the subject as recommended by the
fifth safeguard. The elimination of all persons other than the subject and the hypnotist from
the hypnotic session, including the pre- hypnotic and post-hypnotic phases, in conjunction
with the "neutral" location, would allow both the hypnotist and the subject to conduct the
session in an environment as free as possible from any unnecessary coercive pressure. It
would also seem permissible, in fact advisable, to allow any interested parties to view the
session, so long as it was done in a manner that did not interfere with the privacy of the
session. The Brown court suggests that one-way mirrors or closed circuit television would
serve this purpose well. Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d at 92. Such an arrangement would allow
interested parties to observe the session first hand and to note any possible problems with
the session that perhaps would not be available for the court's inspection on reviewing the
recordations of the session. This requirement of only the witness and the hypnotist being
present at the session would also eliminate sources of unwanted suggestion or expectation
by all other interested parties and would thus seem to decrease the possibility of
stimulating confabulation and hypercompliance on the part of the subject.
i' The fourth safeguard, requiring the hypnotist to try to "elicit every detail that the
witness recalls," seems to be somewhat counter to the purpose of maintaining a neutral
examiner. Perhaps the information that the subject would supply in this pre-hypnotic
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Fifth, prior to being hypnotized the witness should be examined
by the hypnotist to ascertain whether the witness suffers from
any mental or physical disorders that might affect the results of
the session. 131
As a sixth safeguard, we consider it highly desireable that some
type of record of the actual session be preserved.. . [W]e do not go
so far as to require the session and pre-session examination be
video-taped ... we strongly suggest that a videotape system be
utilized... Absent the use of a videotape, an audio tape recording
or a written transcript of the proceedings is an alternative... [In
determining the admissibility ... if videotaping of the hypnosis
session is not employed, the manner in which the session was
conducted becomes less demonstrably reliable and more inher-
ently suspect.
A seventh safeguard relates to the means by which the inter-
view is conducted. The hypnotist should avoid reassuring re-
marks that might assist in stimulating the process of con-
fabulation ... leaving the witness free to present a narrative that
will fill in the details of previous observations of the crime.
Eighth, in weighing the reliability of the session and its results,
the court should carefully consider whether there is independent
'evidence corroborative of or contradictory to statements made
during the trance....
interview could have an adverse effect on the objectivity of the hypnotist, so as to decrease
his ability to conduct the session in as neutral and non-suggestive a manner as possible. It
would seem more in keeping with the purposes of the guidelines to furnish the hypnotist
with only written information as necessary to perform the session and dispense with the
initial "eliciting" of all the details the subject remembers. It would seem preferable, if the
purpose of the pre-hypnotic interview is to have a record of the witness' memories before the
hypnotic session, as suggested by the Brown court, Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d at 92, that
such a record of the pre-hypnotic statements be made prior to the time of the session and
serve as the basis of the recorded information given to the hypnotist to enable him to
conduct the session.
' Before the session the subject should be examined, not only for physical or mental
conditions that could influence the outcome of the session as suggested by the fifth
guideline, but also to determine that the use of hypnosis is appropriate for the type of
memory loss experienced by the witness. See, e.g., Hurd, 86 N.J. at 544, 432 A.2d at 95. In
this regard, if the hypnotist was a psychiatrist, he would be qualified to evaluate not only
the subject's mental status, but his physical state as well.
132 The sixth safeguard, suggesting that some type of record of the session be made and
preserved, should include a record of all contacts between the hypnotist and the subject,
including the pre-hypnotic and post-hypnotic phases. Although under this test the recor-
dation of the session is recommended, not required, it would be hard to envision a
determination of admissibility of the HRT if there were no record available for review. It is
also important to note that "independent" evidence, either supportive or non-supportive of
the admission of the proffered testimony, is a significant factor to be considered in
determining whether the probative value of the evidence is "substantially outweighed by
1986]
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It is important to note that these are not mandatory requirements like
those set out in Hurd, for which non-compliance leads to inadmissibility.
They are truly guidelines that provide a basis for the trial judge's decision
as to the legal relevance of HRT.
If the trial court determines that the testimony is legally relevant, then
the Brown court would require two mandatory safeguards for its in-court
use to prevent the problems of jury misconception and possible infringe-
ment on the defendant's right to confrontation.1 3 3 Because the court
recognized the situation whereby a previously hypnotized witness may
have an increased confidence in his post-hypnotic statements, they
require the court to give "great leeway to a party opponent in cross-
examining the witness" and suggest that the "most advantageous ap-
proaches are to discredit the accuracy of testimony or to question the
hypnotic procedure itself through cross-examination of experts."34 They
would also require that cautionary jury instructions warning the jury of
the possible influence hypnosis may have on a witness be given both
before the time the HRT is presented and again when the jury is
charged.135
Currently, no other jurisdiction specifically advocates or adopts the
relevancy balancing approach. 136 However, in United States v. Valdez,137
in finding inadmissible the post-hypnotic testimony regarding the iden-
tification of a person the witness had reason to know was under suspicion,
the Valdez court applied the same reasoning as the Brown court. The
Valdez court did "not formulate a rule of per se inadmissibility" but
rather examined whether "the probative value of this hypnotically
the danger of unfair prejudice." This recommendation should go far in alleviating the fears
of the court in Shirley regarding a possible reversal of an "otherwise unimpeachable
conviction." See infra note 139. The recommended guidelines proposed by the Brown court
are similar to the mandatory safeguards to be employed in the hypnotic procedure adopted
by the court in State v. Hurd. See supra note 105. Like the Hurd mandatory procedural
safeguards, the Brown v. State safeguards are designed to confront the problems inherent in
the procedure of hypnosis and to provide a basis upon which the trial court can determine
the legal sufficiency of HRT. The Brown u. State court further provides for the protection of
the reliability of the judicial process by requiring two mandatory safeguards if HRT is used
at trial. See infra text accompanying notes 133-35, and note 166.
133 Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d at 93.
134 Id.
135 Id.
131 It would be possible perhaps to include the "substantial compliance" safeguards test,
previously classified as another variant of the Hurd safeguard genre due to its underlying
reliance on the Frye test, as set forth by the court in House v. State, as also advocating a
relevancy balancing approach. The House court did state that for HRT to be admissible, not
only must there be "substantial compliance" with the mandatory guidelines, but also that
the "probative value of a victim's hypnotically refreshed memory outweighs the risk of
unfair prejudice to the accused." House, 445 So. 2d at 827.
137 722 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1984).
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influenced testimony was outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice,
jury confusion or jury misapprehension."138
In lieu of specific criticisms of the relevancy balancing test, it is
reasonable to presume that disadvantages similar to those argued by the
critics of the safeguards approach would be equally applicable to this
approach13 9
E. Totality of Circumstances Test
The totality of circumstances test was first introduced and set out in
State v. Armstrong.140 In 1984 the Idaho Supreme Court also advocated
this test in State v. Iwakiri. 41 Both courts take notice of the supposed
problems inherent in HRT, and the court in Armstrong specifically
addresses the issue of a defendant's right to confrontation. 142
In Armstrong, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and
first-degree sexual assault.14 His pre-trial motions to suppress the HRT
were denied after a hearing at which extensive evidence was heard by the
court on hypnosis in general and the hypnotic session of this witness in
particular. 144 He appealed his conviction directly to the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin on multiple grounds, including a challenge to the admission of
the identification testimony of a witness who had been hypnotized prior
to trial. The witness was hypnotized by a pyschiatrist five days after the
murder. Her description of the man she saw leaving the victim's apart-
ment building remained substantially the same as her pre-hypnotic
98 Id. at 1203, 1201.
139 See supra text accompanying notes 116-118. The Shirley court's oft quoted phrase,
opining that "because the hypnotized subject would frequently be the victim, the eyewit-
ness, or a similar source of crucial testimony against the defendant, any errors in ruling on
the admissibility of such testimony could easily jeopardize otherwise unimpeachable
judgments of conviction" and therefore, "the game is not worth the candle," is primarily
directed at the Hurd safeguards approach, however, its significance pales in light of the
requirements of the relevancy balancing approach. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 40, 641 P.2d at
787, 181 Cal. Rptr at 256. Under the relevancy balancing approach the particular
determinations the trial court is required to make in order to find HRT admissible and the
mandatory safeguards that must be utilized when HRT is admitted at trial would make the
possibility of having an "otherwise unimpeachable conviction" jeopardized by an error in
admitting the HRT essentially negligible. It would seem highly unlikely that if the
testimony was such as to create a significant chance of prejudicial error, then under the
definitive requirements of the relevancy balancing test it would never have been admitted
initially.
140 110 Wis. 2d 555, 329 N.W.2d 386, cert. denied, 461 U.S. 946 (1983).
141 106 Idaho 618, 682 P.2d 571 (1984).
142 Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d at 568-70, 329 N.W.2d at 393. See supra note 79 and
accompanying text.
14a Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d at 559, 329 N.W.2d at 389.
'4 Id. at 564, 329 N.W.2d at 391.
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recollection. 145 After reviewing the evidence presented on hypnosis and
the hypnotic process the court adopted the totality of circumstances test
and determined that the trial court had properly admitted the post-
hypnotic testimony of the witness.
146
The basis of the totality of circumstances rule is that the trial court is
in the best position to determine the admissibility of any evidence,
including that derived from a pre-trial hypnotic session. 147 The trial
court is to look to certain guidelines in order to determine whether the
hypnotic procedure was so suggestive as to render the evidence derived
unreliable for use at trial. The procedural recommendations put forth by
the Iwakiri and Armstrong courts are similar to those of Hurd,148 but not
identical to Hurd nor to each other, and serve only as a guide to the trial
court. Therefore, non-compliance with these guidelines does not automat-
ically result in exclusion and conversely, complete compliance will not
guarantee admission. Instead, after the initial examination of the hyp-
notic procedure, the court must then apply a "totality of the circum-
stances" test to determine if the proffered evidence, in view of all the
circumstances of the case, is sufficiently reliable to merit admission. 149
Both courts insist that the -proponent, if his evidence is deemed
admissible, not mention the fact of hypnosis to the jury at trial. o50 If,
however, the opponent brings it out, then both parties are free to
introduce expert testimony as to the effects of hypnosis on memory.l-l It
is their theory that not informing the jury that a witness has been
hypnotized will remove the problems associated with jury misconception
of the hypnotic process. 5 2 This approach would seem to allow a previ-
ously hypnotized witness to testify to those matters not the subject of the
hypnotic interview, even if the HRT is inadmissible.
IV. COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF THE EXISTING LEGAL TEsTs
The foregoing overview aptly illustrates the difficulty courts have had
in coming to terms with the complexity and the interrelationship of the
"' Id. at 563, 329 N.W.2d at 390.
146 Id. at 573, 329 N.W.2d at 395.
147 Iwakiri, 106 Idaho at 626, 682 P.2d at 579; Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d at 571-73, 329
N.W.2d at 394-95.
148 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
149 Iwakiri, 106 Idaho at 625,682 P.2d at 578; Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d at 574,329 N.W.2d
at 396.
150 Iwakiri, 106 Idaho at 626, 682 P.2d at 579; Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d at 573,329 N.W.2d
at 395.
151 Iwakiri, 106 Idaho at 626,682 P.2d at 580; Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d at 573,329 N.W.2d
at 395.
152 Iwakiri, 106 Idaho at 626, 682 P.2d at 579; Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d at 573,329 N.W.2d
at 395.
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many considerations associated with the use of HRT. These courts have
recognized the many factors to be considered and presumably have
sought to deal with them in a manner most consistent with their
individual judicial policies.
The variety of tests now being used spans the legal spectrum from per
se admissibility to per se inadmissibility, with several intervening
approaches addressing the issues in slightly different manners with
differing emphasis on the various factors to be considered. The ultimate
question involved in the determination of whether hypnotically refreshed
testimony should be admissible in a criminal trial is the proper balanc-
ing, and the method of achieving that balance, between the rights of the
defendant and the needs of the adversary system of criminal justice to
have available all material evidence regarding the crime in order to best
effect the goal of a fair and equitable system of criminal justice for all
parties involved.
The per se rules of admissibility or inadmissibility negate the possible
disadvantages of judicial inefficiency and inconsistency that could occur
when the trial court is left to determine the admissibility of HRT on a
case-by-case basis, since under these rules there is no determination for
the trial court to make. However, the application of these per se rules
cannot achieve the balance of interests necessary to fulfill the goal of the
system.
The per se rule of the credibility approach perhaps begs the question of
the adequate protection of the defendant's right to confrontation by
leaving the entire determination of the credibility of the HRT up to the
jury. This may be especially true when considered in light of the supposed
problems inherent in the hypnotic procedure as used to refresh witness'
recall.1 53 It appears that the proponents' theory of credibility, analogizing
HRT to be no more than another example of "present recollection
refreshed," is unsound in view of the scientific evidence, although not
undisputed, to the contrary. It is, at best, questionable whether a jury of
laymen is capable of justly making such a determination.
The per se rules of inadmissibility seem to include both the reliability
and the safeguards approaches. The safeguards approach is included here
because it also appears to represent a per se rule, by virtue of its
interpretation. It has been interpreted to require mandatory compliance
with all the safeguards as a precondition to admissibility, in the same
way that the strict Frye rule approach of the reliability test requires
"general acceptance" of the scientific procedure as a requisite for admis-
sion. 154
The per se exclusion of hypnotically refreshed testimony, under either
153 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
154 Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 39, 641 P.2d at 787, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 255; Iwakiri, 106 Idaho at
624, 682 P.2d at 577.
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the reliability or the mandatory compliance safeguards test, if all the
procedural guidelines have not been adhered to, gives the appearance of
protecting the defendant's rights, perhaps at the expense of reliable
testimony material to the inquiry at hand and vital to a proper determi-
nation by the trier-of-fact. Under any rule of per se inadmissibility, there
will be situations that will "disallow reliable testimony, thus thwarting
the truthseeking function of our judicial system." 155
The inapplicability of the Frye rule as a precondition of admissibility is
supported as well by independent authority. It has been well stated that
"[g]eneral scientific acceptance is a proper condition for taking judicial
notice of scientific facts, but it is not a suitable criterion for the
admissibility of scientific evidence." 156
The test advocated by the court in House v. State,157 a modified
safeguards approach requiring only "substantial compliance" with man-
datory safeguards, appears to be the one adopted by the Clermont County
Court of Appeals in State v. Weston.158 This approach moves one step
closer to achieving the necessary balance, however, it seems to falter at
the last moment by not adequately describing its requirements.
The totality of circumstances test is a move toward the desired method
of balancing, but it seems to have gone too far. The problem with this test
also occurs in its final step in determination. After the trial court has
reviewed the hypnotic procedure to verify compliance with the recom-
mended safeguards, the court is then to determine whether "in view of all
the circumstances, the proposed testimony is sufficiently reliable to merit
admission."'159 This final step appears to be so vague as to make it
meaningless as a legal test; a test which is no test at all. The actual
"standardlessness" of this test would seem to achieve nothing more than
to open the door to further litigation in order to more accurately describe
its boundries.
The relevancy balancing test seems to address all the issues most
directly, in that it: (1) considers all the interests;160 (2) provides recom-
mended safeguards to maximize the level of reliability of HRT;16I and (3)
provides a just and definite means for balancing the necessary rights and
interests. 162 After the trial court has reviewed the proffered evidence in
155 Iwakiri, 106 Idaho at 624, 682 P.2d at 577.
'5 C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203 at 608 (E. Cleary 3rd ed. 1984)
[hereinafter MCCORMICK] (emphasis added).
117 445 So. 2d 815, 827 (Miss. 1984).
5 Weston, 16 Ohio App. 3d at 287, 289, 475 N.E.2d at 815.
159 Iwakiri, 106 Idaho at 625, 682 P.2d at 578.
"o By its very nature, the balancing test requires the court to recognize and weigh both
the rights of the defendant and the needs of the adversary system.
165 See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
162 The requirement of determining the "legal relevancy" of HRT provides the just and
definite means for balancing the rights of all parties involved.
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regard to the level of compliance of the hypnotic procedure with the
recommended guidelines, the court must then apply the test of "legal
relevancy.1G3 It is at this juncture that the safeguards approach, whether
in its mandatory or substantial compliance method of application, fails to
provide the court with a legally sufficient basis for the ultimate deter-
mination of the admissibility of HRT.
In contrast, the relevancy balancing approach definitively describes
what the court is required to do in order to make such a determination.
Under this test the court must determine that the probative value of the
proffered testimony is not "substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading of the jury or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." 16
Here again, there is independent support for the superiority of the
relevancy balancing approach. It has been stated, in regard to this
method of determining admissibility, that "the traditional balancing
method focuses the court's attention where it belongs--on the actual
usefulness of the evidence . . . " and further, that "unlike the general or
the substantial acceptance standards, it [the relevancy balancing ap-
proach] is sensitive to the perceived degree of prejudice . . .associated
with the scientific technique in issue."165
Further, if the testimony is deemed admissible, two mandatory safe-
guards are enforced by the court that directly address the concerns
associated with the in-court use of HRT. The court is required to give
"great leeway" in cross-examination and to give cautionary jury instruc-
tions both before the HRT is presented and again at the time the jury is
charged. 166
The defendant's rights and interests are fully considered under this
approach. Equally important is the fact that these interests are effec-
tively balanced with the need for all material evidence in order to allow
the finder-of-fact to properly and justly perform its function.
Critical evaluation of the five basic approaches utilized to determine
163 Brown v. State, 426 So, 2d at 90, 93.
164 Id. at 88; accord, Valdez, 722 F.2d at 1201.
165 McCoRMICK, supra note 156, at 609.
1 Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d at 93. These instructions should warn the jury of the
potential influence hypnosis may have on a witness. At a minimum, such an instruction
should carefully advise the jury that HRT should carry no greater weight than other
testimony and that hypnosis is not a guarantor of truth, but rather only an aid in
recollection. Id. at 93-94. These twice-given mandatory jury instructions are aimed directly
at the problem envisioned by the court in People v. Gonzales, when the Gonzales court
expressed concern that the mere admission of HRT would give it an unwarranted "aura of
reliability" in the eyes of the jury. Gonzales, 108 Mich App. at 160, 310 N.W.2d at 313.
Surely such cautionary jury instructions as the Brown court would administer would cause
the jurors to cast a more critical eye, to more closely scrutinize the HRT, than they would
ordinarily do with normal eyewitness testimony and if so, would alleviate the concern
expressed by the Gonzales court.
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the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony thus reveals that
the relevancy balancing test is the one that best achieves the proper
balance of interests necessary to promote the ultimate goal of a fair,
equitable and effective system of criminal justice. However, because
other approaches are available, and the choice of a legal test seems to be
primarily a matter of judicial policy, one further inquiry must be made.
Before the relevancy balancing test can be recommended as the approach
that should be utilized in this jurisdiction, it is necessary to determine
whether such an approach is, not only appropriate for, but also, the
method most consistent with the existing judicial policies in the State of
Ohio.
V. APPLICATION AND RECOMMENDATION
The ultimate determination of the legal test to be utilized in any
jurisdiction to evaluate the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony involves two seperate matters of judicial policy. The first concerns
the level of commitment to the trial court to rule on the admissibility of
proffered evidence. Second, the legal test must be the one most consistent
with the jurisdiction's existing evidentiary rules.
In State v. Maurer,167 the Ohio Supreme Court stated, in reference to
the defendant's claim that the admission of certain photographic evidence
was prejudicial error, that "'[t]he trial court has broad discretion in the
admission * * * of evidence and unless it has clearly abused its discretion
and the defendant has been materially prejudiced thereby, this court
should be slow to interfere."' 6 8 This policy of endowing the trial court
with "broad discretion" in the admission of evidence is given even greater
weight by the court's holding in State v. Williams.16 9
In Williams, the court stated, in ruling on the admissiblity of expert
testimony regarding spectrographic voice analysis, that "we leave to the
discretion of this state's judiciary, on a case by case basis, to decide
whether the questioned testimony is relevant .... ,17 Thus, the decisions
in both Maurer and Williams indicate a strong judicial policy for
evidentiary rulings by the trial courts on a case-by-case basis.171 It
follows then that any legal rule governing the admissibility of hypnoti-
cally refreshed testimony in Ohio should be consistent with this policy.
The per se rules of the credibility and the reliability tests possess no
element of individual case-by-case determination by the trial court and
167 15 Ohio St. 3d 239, 473 N.E.2d 768 (1984).
168 Id. at 265, 473 N.E.2d at 791 (quoting State v. Hymore, 9 Ohio St. 2d 122, 128, 224
N.E.2d 126, 130 (1967)) (emphasis added).
169 4 Ohio St. 3d 53, 446 N.E.2d 444 (1983).
170 Id. at 58, 446 N.E.2d at 448.
171 Accord, State v. Hymore, 9 Ohio St. 2d 122, 224 N.E.2d 126 (1967).
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would therefore seem to be counter to Ohio's established policy in this
regard. Both the safeguards and the relevancy balancing approaches, due
to their reliance on a judicial consideration of the procedures surrounding
any hypnotic session do, however, incorporate this essential characteris-
tic of existing judicial policy.
The second prong of the policy inquiry revolves around the jurisdic-
tion's existing evidentiary rules. Ohio has provided by statute the rules
that govern the admission of evidence. 17 2 The ones of primary concern to
the issue of the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony are
embodied in Article IV of the Ohio Rules of Evidence, Rules 401, 402, and
403.173 These rules are analogous, if not identical as is Rule 401, to the
Federal Rules of Evidence and are meant to codify the rules in a form
most appropriate to utilization by a state judicial system and, concur-
rently, to reaffirm the existing law of the State of Ohio. 174
At this point in the inquiry it is significant to note that the relevancy
balancing test, as described in Brown v. State,175 and seemingly applied
without reference to Brown in United States v. Valdez, 176 shares a
common basis of legal analysis, an underlying reliance on these same
analogous statutory provisions, with the situation in Ohio. The Fifth
Circuit's decision in Valdez was premised on Rules 401, 402, and 403 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Similarly, in Brown v. State the court was
concerned with determining a rule of law applicable to hypnotically
refreshed testimony which was consistent with Florida Evidence Code,
172 Oaio R. EVID.
173 Ofio R. EVID. 401, 402, 403.
17' These Ohio Rules of Evidence are as follows:
Rule 401. Definition of 'Relevant Evidence'
'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Rule 402. Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible; Irrelevant Evidence Inad-
missible
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States, by the Constitution of the State of Ohio, by
statute enacted by the General Assembly not in conflict with a rule of the
Supreme Coirt of Ohio, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court of Ohio. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.
Rule 403. Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion,
or Waste of Time
(A) Exclusion mandatory. Although relevant, evidence is not admissible if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of
confusion of the issues, or of misleading the jury.
(B) Exclusion discretionary. Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by considerations of undue delay, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
175 426 So. 2d 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
176 722 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1984).
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Sections 90.401, 90.402, and 90.403 which are patterned after the Federal
Rules of Evidence. 177 Barring any countervailing policy considerations,
the analysis utilized by the courts in Valdez and Brown v. State would be
applicable to a resolution of this issue in Ohio. Both these courts, when
confronted with the multiple lines of authority on the proper test to be
applied to hypnotically refreshed testimony, first undertook to determine
if any policy existed that mandated the use of a particular test. This
question arises with specific reference to the applicability of the Frye test
of general acceptance in regard to hypnotically refreshed testimony.
In Brown v. State, the court determined that it was not bound to apply
the Frye rule since it had not been adopted in Florida as the test to be
applied to scientific evidence. 178 The court in United States v. Valdez
determined that the Frye test was not applicable to hypnotically re-
freshed testimony since it was concerned only with the admission of
expert testimony on the result of a scientific procedure. 179 Further, the
Valdez court noted, but did not undertake to resolve, the question of
whether the Federal Rules of Evidence may have abolished the Frye
test.180
This initial inquiry is very much in harmony with Ohio's existing
policy on scientific evidence. In State v. Williams,'8 ' the supreme court,
when faced with the issue of the rule of law to be applied to expert
testimony on the results of a "voice spectography" test, first stated that
"[t]his court has never adopted the 'Frye test"' and then went on to
determine the rule of law most consistent with existing Ohio law.182 The
Williams court's patent rejection of the Frye rule indicates that any
approach utilizing it as its basic premise would not be consistent with
existing Ohio law.183 Therefore, because both the reliability test and the
safeguards approach have such a basis, they would not be acceptable as
the proper legal test to be applied to hypnotically refreshed testimony in
Ohio.
Following the determinations in Brown v. State and Valdez that the
Frye rule was not applicable to hypnotically refreshed testimony, these
177 Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d at 88.
178 Id. at 87.
179 Valdez, 722 F.2d at 1201.
'80 Id. at 1201 n.20.
"" 4 Ohio St. 3d 53, 446 N.E.2d 444 (1983).
182 Id. at 57 n.5, 446 N.E.2d at 447 n.5.
183 It is for this reason, in addition to the superiority of the relevancy balancing approach
in regard to the final determination to be made by the trial court, that the legal test to be
applied to HRT announced in the very thoughtful opinion of the Clermont County Court of
Appeals in State v. Weston, 16 Ohio App. 3d 279, 475 N.E.2d 805 (Clermont County 1984)
is not the one that should be utilized in Ohio. By adopting even the "substantial compliance"
method of application of the safeguards approach, the court has in fact adopted a test which
has as its basic underpinning the rigid structure of the Frye rule.
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courts then proceeded to determine the rule of law most consistent with
their individual jurisdictional policies. Similarly, in State v. Williams,
after declining to establish a "concrete rule," the Frye test, of admissibil-
ity regarding voice print analysis, the court "endorse[d] a more flexible
standard" and stated that the "Rules of Evidence establish adequate
preconditions for admissibility."'1 4
It is quite clear that the statutory provisions of the Ohio Rules of
Evidence control the admissibility of any evidence in Ohio, including
hypnotically refreshed testimony. Rule 402 provides that all relevant
evidence is admissible unless contrary to certain enumerated excep-
tions.18 5 Rule 403 further qualifies the provisions of Rule 402 and
mandates that even relevant evidence is inadmissible if the "probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of
confusion of the issues, or of misleading the jury."1s6 The Supreme Court
of Ohio has further decided that it is the trial courts that should make
this determination on a case-by-case basis and that a "concrete rule" of
admissibility for scientific evidence is unacceptable under existing Ohio
judicial policies.
Not only does the relevancy balancing test coincide with the approach
embodied in the Ohio Rules of Evidence, but its other elements are also
wholly consistent with the policies articulated by the Ohio Supreme
Court regarding the function of the trial courts in determining the
admissibility of evidence on an individual case basis. Therefore, because
this test is most consistent with existing Ohio law, both statutory and
judicial, the relevancy balancing test is recommended as the one that
should be utilized in Ohio to determine the admissibility of hypnotically
refreshed testimony.
VI. CONCLUSION
The determination of the legal sufficiency, and hence the admissibility,
in a criminal trial, of testimony by a witness who has been hypnotized
114 Williams, 4 Ohio St. 3d at 57-58, 446 N.E.2d at 447-48.
r' See supra note 174, OHIo R. EviD. 402.
186 See supra note 174, Omo R. EviD. 403. It could, perhaps, be argued that, because the
requirements of Rule 403 "stand behind" all the other Rules of Evidence, the inclusion of the
determination by the trial court that the probative value of the HRT is not "substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice..." is repetitive and unnecessary. However,
because the goal of the evidentiary rules (statutory and judicial) is to ensure a fair and just
determination of the issue before the court that is based solely upon legally sufficient
evidence, the fact that this requirement of an initial sua sponte determination by the court,
when considered in light of the other factors required by the relevancy balancing approach,
is specifically built-in to the test itself would best serve to minimize any possibility for error
detrimental to the defendant and, simultaneously, to further aid in ensuring the integrity
of the system.
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prior to trial in an effort to aid him in remembering the events related to
a crime is an issue that has repeatedly confronted, and perhaps at times
confounded, the American judicial system. No less than five different
legal rules governing the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony have been adopted by the various state and federal jurisdictions
that have addressed and resolved this issue. The current array of tests
runs the gamut of admissibility from per se admissible to per se inadmis-
sible. This lack of uniformity of decision stems, in part, from the nature
of the underlying question: the reliability of hypnosis to aid a witness'
recollection. Because courts must, to some extent, depend on information
from experts in the field of hypnosis to reach the proper legal conclusion,
and because the experts expound conflicting views on the subject, their
input has not been dispositive of the question. In addition to these
non-legal considerations, the courts must also fashion a rule of law that
is consistent with the evidentiary rules and other judicial policies of the
jurisdiction.
The proper test for determining the admissibility of hypnotically
refreshed testimony must be the one that best promotes the ultimate goal
of a fair and effective system of criminal justice for all parties involved.
A critical comparative analysis of the existing legal tests that have been
applied to hypnotically refreshed testimony shows the relevancy balanc-
ing test to be the one that accomplishes this goal. This test is sensitive
both to the needs of the adversary system for all material evidence that
will aid the trier-of-fact in justly determining the issue before it and the
rights of the defendant to due process of law and to confront a witness
against him. It recognizes and protects the needs of the system by not
holding the testimony per se inadmissible no matter how reliable it could
be shown to be in a particular instance. It provides for a definitive method
by which the trial court can determine the admissibility of the testimony
on a case-by-case basis. The defendant's rights are protected by providing
safeguards to be utilized in the hypnotic procedure and, if the testimony
is determined to be admissible, mandating two additional safeguards for
the in-court use of hypnotically refreshed testimony to further ensure the
protection of these rights.
This test is, as well, the one that is most consistent with the existing
evidentiary rules8 7 and judicial policies in the State of Ohio. The
requirements of the relevancy balancing test are mandated by the Ohio
Rules of Evidence. Further, they are in complete harmony With other
rules of the court regarding the function of the trial court in determining
the admissibility of proffered evidence and a rejection of per se rules of
admissibility. Therefore, as a matter of statutory and judicial policy, the
relevancy balancing test is the proper test to be applied to hypnotically
refreshed testimony in Ohio.
DR. THOMAS H. ALLISON
187 OHio R. EVID..
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